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FEBRUARY 26, 2008 
GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY 
SCHOOL OF LAW 
DISSENT 
WILLIAM A. FLETCHER" 
Thank you, Professor Oppenheimer, for your generous introduction. 
Thank you also, Golden Gate Law School, for your invitation to 
participate in your lecture series on dissent. The series is in honor of 
your distinguished graduate, Justice Jesse Carter, who served on the 
California Supreme Court for twenty years, from 1939 to 1959.1 He was 
known on that Court as the "great dissenter," writing a total of 510 
dissents, or an average of a little over twenty per year. At least three of 
those dissents were vindicated in the United States Supreme Court when 
that Court agreed with Justice Carter,2 
Perhaps the most notable of these was Justice Carter's 1947 dissent 
in Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission/ in which the California 
Supreme Court held that the State of California could deny a commercial 
fishing license to Torao Takahashi. Takahashi was born in Japan and 
came to the United States as a legal immigrant in 1907. From 1915 to 
1942, he was licensed as a commercial fisherman by the State of 
California, During World War II, Takahashi was interned by the federal 
government as an alien Japanese, Upon his release after the war, 
'Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
I J. EDWARD JOHNSON, JUSTICES OF CALIFORNIA, 1900-1950, VOLUME II (1966), available 
at http://www.ggu.edullawlibrary/jessecarterlbiography/attachmentljustices_oCcalifomia.pdf. 
2 In addition to the Takahashi dissent, they were Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades 
Council, 291 P.2d I (Cal. 1955), vacated by 353 U.S. 26 (1957); Anderson v. Atchison, Topeka & 
Santa Fe Ry. Co., 187 P.2d 729 (Cal. 1947), rev'd, 333 U.S. 821 (1948). 
3 Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 185 P.2d 805, 816 (Cal. 1947) (Carter, 1., 
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Takahashi sought reissuance of his commercial fishing license. 
In 1943, California had passed a statute prohibiting the issuance of a 
license to "any alien Japanese." In 1945, in an attempt to insulate the 
statute from constitutional challenge, California amended it to prohibit, 
more broadly, the issuance of a license to any alien ineligible for 
citizenship. At that time, members of several racially defined groups, 
including Japanese, were ineligible under federal law for citizenship 
unless they were born in the United States. The 1945 amendment of the 
California statute thus had the consequence (as well as the intent) of 
continuing the prohibition of the issuance of licenses to alien Japanese. 
Justice Carter dissented from the holding of the California Supreme 
Court. He wrote: 
[T]he statute not only discriminates against aliens solely on upon the 
basis of alienage but goes further and excludes only certain classes of 
aliens, namely, those who are ineligible for citizenship .... 
[I]nasmuch as the fishing involved is commercial fishing, an age-old 
means of livelihood, the issue is whether an alien resident may be 
excluded from engaging in a gainful occupation - from working -
from making a living. 
A mere statement of the problem should compel an answer favorable 
to the alien if there is any security in our constitutional guarantees.4 
The United States Supreme Court agreed with Justice Carter, 
reversing the decision of the California Supreme Court in an opinion by 
Justice Black.5 Justice Carter's dissent in Takahashi on the California 
Supreme Court is an appropriate introduction to several famous dissents 
on the United States Supreme Court. 
In the first, Plessy v. Ferguson,6 the question was whether the State 
of Louisiana could require, by law, that black and white American 
citizens ride in separate railroad cars. The majority of the Supreme 
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment allowed Louisiana to do so. 
The first Justice Harlan disagreed: 
[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this 
country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no 
caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor 
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens 
4 1d. 
5 Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). 
6 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown 
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2
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are equal before the law.7 
In the second, Lochner v. New York,s the question was whether the 
State of New York could pass a law forbidding an employer to require 
that an employee work more than 60 hours per week. The majority of 
the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment prevented New 
York from passing such a law. Justice Holmes disagreed: 
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of 
this country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed 
with that theory, I should desire to study it further and long before 
making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, 
because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has 
nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in 
law .... The 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's 
Social Statics.9 
In the third, Abrams v. United States,IO the question was whether the 
distribution of two dissident leaflets in New York City during World 
War I by self-described anarchists was a crime under the federal 
Espionage Act. The majority of the Supreme Court held that it was. 
Justice Holmes, joined by Justice Brandeis, disagreed: 
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly 
logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and 
want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your 
wishes in law and sweep away all opposition .... But when men have 
realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to 
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own 
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade 
in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get 
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the 
only ground upon which their wishes safelr can be carried out. That 
at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. 1 
In the fourth, Olmstead v. United States,12 the question was whether 
7 Id. 
8 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), overruled by West 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
9 Id. 
10 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
II Id. 
12 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479-80 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), 
overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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evidence obtained by illegal wiretapping by the Government was 
admissible in a criminal prosecution. The majority of the Court held that 
it was admissible. Justice Brandeis disagreed: 
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty 
when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to 
freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-
minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious 
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without 
understanding . 
. . . By the laws of Washington, wire-tapping is a crime. To 
prove its case, the Government was obliged to lay bare the crimes 
committed by its officers on its behalf. A federal court should not 
. h . . 13 permIt suc a prosecutIon to contmue. 
Finally, in Baker v. Carr,14 the question was whether a claim under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment brought by 
voters whose voting districts were malapportioned, and whose votes 
therefore counted less than those of voters in other districts, presented a 
political question beyond the competence of the federal courts. The 
majority of the Court held that this was not a political question. Justice 
Frankfurter disagreed: 
Even assuming the indispensable intellectual disinterestedness on the 
part of judges in [reviewing apportionment schemes], they do not have 
accepted legal standards or criteria or even reliable analogies to draw 
upon for making judicial judgments. To charge courts with the task of 
accommodating the incommensurable factors of policy that underlie 
these mathematical puzzles is to attribute, however flatteringly, 
. . d 15 ommcompetence to JU ges. 
Five critically important Supreme Court cases, five dissents. The 
first four have become law, or at least mostly so. Plessy was overruled in 
1954 in Brown v. Board of Education. 16 Lochner and substantive 
economic due process were repudiated by the Roosevelt Court in the late 
1930s.17 Abrams has been mostly overruled,ls although sometimes -
\3 [d. 
14 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,268 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
15 [d. 
16 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
17 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); United States v. Carolene 
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
18 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,451-52 (1969). 
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particularly in wartime or near-wartime, as in Abrams itself - it seems 
to revive. Olmstead was overruled in 1961 in Mapp v. Ohio,19 and 
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is now 
inadmissible in a criminal prosecution. 
The last dissent has not become law. Baker v. Carr has not been 
overruled. Instead, it has become an 800-pound gorilla, requiring one 
person-one vote in every corner of our country except in the United 
States Senate.20 Even apportionment plans for state senates that were 
modeled after the United States Senate, with two senators for each 
county regardless of population, have been struck down.21 One might 
ask whether Baker v. Carr has been a good thing - do we like frequent 
reapportionment (and partisan gerrymanders); do we like safe seats on 
both sides of the aisle, such that the only challenger an elected official is 
likely to face will be from the far left or the far right of his or her own 
party; do we like the extreme partisanship thereby produced in our 
legislatures; do we like term limits, which sacrifice good, experienced 
politicians because we feel we have no other way getting rid of a bad 
politicians who hold safe seats? Should we have listened to Justice 
Frankfurter? 
In these cases, the Justices have been our secular prophets, 
interpreting the central text of our civic faith, the United States 
Constitution. These Justices have pointed the way to our future, showing 
us what we and our government can and should become. This is a justly 
celebrated function - indeed, perhaps the most important function - of 
dissent in our judicial system. 
But the function of dissent has changed over the years. The 
prophetic dissents are still there, though we are not in a position until 
sometime later fully to appreciate which dissents fall into this category. 
One of the reasons we may not be in a position to do this is that there are 
now so many dissents. Between 1789 to 1928, dissents and concurrences 
were filed in only 15% of all cases decided by the Supreme Court.22 
Between 1930 and 1957, dissents alone (not counting concurrences) were 
filed in 42% of all cases decided by the Court.23 In October Term 1992, 
dissents alone were filed in 71 % of all cases decided by the Court.24 
19 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
20 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. I (1964). 
21 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568. 
22 Evan A. Evans, The Dissenting Opinion -Its Use and Abuse, 3 Mo. L. REv. 120, 138-41 
(1938). 
23 Karl M. ZoBell, Division oj Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History oj Judicial 
Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186, 205 (1959). 
24 Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33, 35. 
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Other functions of dissent are just as important - though perhaps 
not as dramatic - as the prophetic function just described. While 
declarations, or predictions, of high constitutional principle are 
important, so too is the workaday functioning of dissent. 
First, somewhat paradoxically, ajudge or justice may write a dissent 
in order not to have to write one. Sooner or later, all appellate judges 
have the experience of writing a draft dissent that ends up persuading the 
majority to his or her point of view. A number of Justice Brandeis's 
unpublished opinions were proposed dissents that performed this 
function. 25 Sometimes a draft dissent becomes the majority opinion 
before anything is published by the court, though a careful reader may 
discern signs that the published dissent had originally been written as the 
majority opinion.26 Occasionally, a published dissent later becomes the 
published the majority opinion after rehearing by the court.27 
Second, a dissent (or threatened dissent) may make the majority 
opinion better. A dissent may improve a majority opinion in many small 
ways. For example, a dissent may persuade the majority to change its 
description of the facts or some point of its analysis; the result is not 
changed, but the resulting majority opinion is a better piece of work. I 
confess that I have occasionally been tempted not to point out in a 
dissent all of the majority's mistakes, hoping that if they are left 
uncorrected the world at large will see the members of the majority for 
the misguided and ignorant creatures that they are (or at least, for the 
moment, that they seem to be). But I have resisted this unworthy 
impulse. I do so because I am not sure that I can trust the world at large 
to see, unaided, the majority's mistakes. More important, I do so 
because when the shoe is on the other foot, as it sometimes is, I want a 
dissenter to help me to improve my majority opinion. 
A dissent can also help an opinion in large ways. This may 
sometimes be seen in cases where a dissent should have been, but was 
not, written. Justice Scalia has put it with characteristic directness: 
"Ironic as it may seem, I think a higher percentage of the worst opinions 
of my Court - not in result but in reasoning - are unanimous ones.,,28 
An example of Justice Scalia's point is Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona,29 in 
25 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT WORK xx (1957). 
26 See, e.g., Moore v. City ofE. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 541 (I 977)(White, J., dissenting). 
27 See, e.g., Brockmeyer v. May, 361 F.3d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 2004) (Fletcher, J., 
dissenting), withdrawn and replaced by 383 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2004). 
28 Scalia, supra note 23, at 41. 
29 Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973), overruled by Oregon ex rei. State 
Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (\977). 
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which the Court held unanimously, in an opinion by Justice Marshall, 
that the "equal footing doctrine" required the Court to apply federal 
common law to determine title to land that had previously been at the 
bottom of the Colorado River. I think it fair to say that in Bonelli Cattle 
the Court as a whole cared little and knew less about the question it was 
deciding. Only three years later, in Oregon ex rei. State Land Board v. 
Corvallis Sand & Gravel CO.,30 the Court reversed itself. Now educated 
by the amicus briefs of twenty-six unhappy states, the Court held that 
state law rather than federal common law governed questions of 
ownership of riverbottom land. Poor Justice Marshall, the author of 
Bonelli Cattle, was left almost alone in dissent.31 
Third, a dissent can keep (or at least try to keep) the majority 
honest. Judges are not immune from the normal human temptation to 
ignore or to minimize inconvenient facts. A dissent can sometimes force 
the majority to acknowledge facts that work against the result favored by 
the majority. And if the dissent cannot force an acknowledgement, at 
least it can point out the dishonesty of the majority opinion. An example 
is Demore v. Kim,32 in which Kim, a lawful permanent resident alien who 
came to this country from Korea at the age of six, was placed in 
deportation proceedings as a result of state court convictions for burglary 
and petty theft with priors. Immediately upon his release from prison at 
age twenty-one, he was placed in federal custody pending the outcome of 
his deportation proceeding. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), he was not 
entitled to bail during the course of the proceedings. The district court 
held the no-bail statute unconstitutional, and the Ninth Circuit agreed.33 
There was no contention that Kim was dangerous or that he was a serious 
flight risk. Pending the outcome of the litigation, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service released Kim on a $5,000 bond without requesting 
a bail hearing. 
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the no-bail 
statute. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority that Kim 
"conceded" that he was deportable,34 and that the issue in the case was 
whether he could be detained without bail for the "brief period 
30 Oregon ex rei. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977). 
31 [d. at 382 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice White joined Justice Marshall's dissent. 
Justice Brennan declined to join the dissent, noting only that he would not overrule Bonelli Cattle. 
[d. 
32 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
33 Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 5\0 (2003). 
In the interest of full disclosure, I note that I was the author of the Ninth Circuit opinion. 
34 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.s. at 514, 522 n. 6, and 531. 
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necessary,,35 to complete removal proceedings. The no-bail statute had a 
very different practical and constitutional consequence depending on the 
length of the detention. In concluding that the detention at issue was 
"brief' because of Kim's "concession," the Court made a hard case easy. 
But, in fact, the case was not easy. As the record made clear, Kim had 
made no such contention. He vigorously contested his deportation, and 
his deportation proceeding (and therefore his detention) were going to be 
lengthy. Justice Souter pointed out the Court's misrepresentation of the 
record, politely calling it a mistake: "At the outset, there is the Court's 
mistaken suggestion that Kim 'conceded' his removability. The Court 
cites no statement before any court conceding removability, and I can 
find none.,,36 
Fourth, a dissent can predict the legal and practical consequences of 
the majority opinion. Here, there are two schools of thought. Some 
judges like to point out in a parade of horribles all of the terrible 
consequences that will result from the majority's decision. For example, 
in Stone v. Powell,37 the Court held that a federal court cannot review on 
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 a state court's detennination of 
the admissibility of evidence obtained through an allegedly unlawful 
search and seizure. Justice Brennan, in dissent, predicted that the Court's 
decision would lead to an evisceration of federal habeas for state 
prisoners on all federal constitutional claims that are not "guilt-related.,,38 
This approach has its dangers, for by pointing out the dire consequences 
the dissent may increase the likelihood that they occur. Other judges 
prefer to leave the dire consequences unstated, and if possible to concur 
in the judgment, while making clear the narrowness of the majority's 
holding. Justice Stewart was particularly fond of this technique.39 
Fifth, a dissent makes clear to the losing party or parties that their 
arguments were heard and understood. A close-to-home example for me 
is Lutwak v. United States.40 The issue was whether marriages under the 
federal War Brides Act were fraudulent. After World War II, a woman 
legally in the United States arranged for her two brothers, European Jews 
35 [d. at 513. 
36 [d. at 541 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
37 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
38 [d. at 517-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I am therefore justified in apprehending that the 
groundwork is being laid today for a drastic withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction, if not for all 
grounds of alleged unconstitutional detention, then at least for claims - for example, of double 
jeopardy, entrapment, self-incrimination, Miranda violations, and use of invalid identification 
procedures - that this Court later decides are not 'guilt-related. "'). 
39 See, e.g., Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Baugus, 434 U.S. 35, 45 (1977) (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
40 Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953). 
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who had survived the Holocaust, to marry women who had served in the 
American military during the war. If valid, the marriages permitted the 
two men to immigrate to the United States. The government brought a 
criminal prosecution against the woman and her brothers, charging that 
the marriages were fraudulent. The issue before the Supreme Court was 
whether the marital privilege protected the defendants from the 
introduction of testimony by the women to whom the men were 
purportedly married. The Court held that the testimony was admissible, 
despite a powerful dissent by Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Black 
and Frankfurter.41 The defendants were convicted and served time in 
federal prison. The woman was the grandmother of a college roommate 
and close friend. While my friend would have preferred for the Court to 
come out the other way, Justice Jackson's dissent gives him comfort, 
even some satisfaction. Three Justices heard, and understood, the 
argument made on behalf of his grandmother. I often think of this case 
when I write dissents. 
Sixth, a dissent can call for law reform by the legislature. A recent 
example is Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber CO.,42 decided by the 
Supreme Court in 2007. Lilly Ledbetter worked for Goodyear between 
1979 and 1998. She was the only woman "area manager" at her plant, 
and was paid substantially less than her male counterparts. The Court 
held that the 180-day statute of limitations for sex-based discrimination 
under Title VII began to run when an allegedly unlawful difference in 
payment occurred, with the result that when Ledbetter finally discovered 
that she had been paid less than her male counterparts, she could recover 
damages only for the 180 days before she filed suit. Justice Ginsburg, 
joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, vigorously dissented. 
Justice Ginsburg explicitly called for legislative corrections of the 
"Court's parsimonious reading of Title VII.,,43 Ms. Ledbetter spoke at 
the Democratic Convention in the summer of 2008, arguing for a change 
in the law (as well as for a change in administrations). The new 
Congress responded with the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of2009, which 
expressed disapproval of the Court's Ledbetter decision and amended 
Title VII and related antidiscrimination laws to allow recovery of up to 
two years' back pay.44 
Seventh, a dissent can appeal to the judgment of other judges. A 
dissenting federal appellate judge may appeal to his or her colleagues to 
41 [d. at 620 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
42 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618,127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007). 
43 [d. at 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2188 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
44 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009). 
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take a case en banc because of disagreement with the majority's 
decision.45 Or a judge may concur in the opinion (or the jUdgment) of his 
or her colleagues, while making clear that he or she disagrees with an 
earlier decision of the court that binds the panel on which the judge sits.46 
The audience for such a dissent is the active judges of the circuit, who by 
majority vote can decide to rehear the case en banco If a case is taken en 
banc, the decision of the three-judge panel can be overridden - either 
because the en banc court holds the panel decision was wrong under 
existing law, or because the en banc court reverses earlier circuit 
authority that bound the panel. If an appellate judge has tried 
unsuccessfully to convince his or her colleagues to take a panel decision 
en banc, that judge may write a dissent from the failure to go en banco 
Such a dissent is the functional equivalent of a petition for certiorari, but 
written by a judge instead of a party. Some are successful,47 but most are 
not.48 
Finally, a dissent can appeal to the judgment of a later time. This 
brings us full circle to the famous, and prophetic, dissents with which I 
began. Golden Gate University Law School is justly proud to count 
among its alumni Justice Carter, a dissenter in this proud tradition. 
45 See, e.g., Vasquez v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 1101, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008) (O'Scannlain, J., 
dissenting). 
46 See, e.g., United States v. Belgarde, 300 FJd 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2002) (Gould, J., 
concurring). 
47 See, e.g., United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918 (9th Cir.) (Bea, 
l, dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 30 (2008); Musladin v. 
Lamarque, 427 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2005) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane), 
vacated, 549 U.S. 70 (2006). 
48 See, e.g., S. Or. Barter Fair v. Jackson County, 401 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir.) (Berzon, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 826 (2005); KOM ex rei. WJM 
v. Reedsport Sch. Dist., 210 F.3d 1098, 1099 (9th Cir.) (O'Scannlain, l, dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en bane), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1010 (2000). 
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